# Binghamton Round 3 Neg v Binghamton TT

## Off

### 1nc – k

**We have reached the end of art and history – the patriarchal capitalist regime no longer relies on capital as production of material or extraction of labor but rather affective fuel – the 1ac is not in *opposition* to colonial control but is the *new normal***

James 14 (Robin James, Associate Professor of Philosophy at UNC Charlotte, Incandescence, Melancholy, and Feminist Bad Vibes: A Response to Ziarek’s Feminist Aesthetics and the Politics of Modernism, differences:A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, Vol. 25, No.. 2, p. 120-123, Duke University Press)

To use Jack Halberstam’s term, we like our women to “go gaga” because this incandescence, this “unpredictable feminine” (114) methodology allows us to eke even more light out of otherwise exhausted enlightenment modernity. If we’ve reached, as Ziarek discusses, the so-called end of art and the end of history (and the end of tonality and the end of representation and, well, the end of modernity), then the only way to find more resources is, like Pixar’s wall-e, by sifting through our vast piles of waste. And in that waste heap is abject femininity (what musicologist Susan Cook calls the feminized “abject popular”). Femininity is abject because its exclusion from patriarchy is what constitutes patriarchy as a coherent system. In both Ziarek’s aesthetics of potentiality and in resilience discourse, women artists do the cultural work of remaking abjection or constitutive exclusion into ecstatic radiance.13 In the former case, that work is revolutionary; in the latter case, that work normalizes. Resilience discourse transposes feminist revolution into a nationalist, patriarchal, white supremacist practice. Take, for example, Katy Perry’s “Firework,” in which the lyrics trace the affective journey from dejection to radiant exceptionality. The song begins by asking listeners to identify with feelings of irrelevance, weakness, loneliness, and hopelessness; it posits and affirms damage, suffering, and pain. But then Perry’s narrator argues that in spite and perhaps because of this damage, the listener has precisely the means to connect to others, to make a difference, to have hope: “[T]here’s a spark in you / You just gotta ignite the light and let it shine.” She uses the metaphor of fireworks (and their association with u.s. Independence Day celebrations) to describe the listener’s self-transformation from black dust to shining light: you may feel like trash, but if you can just light yourself on fire, that trash will burn with a dazzling radiance that lights up the sky, just as it lights up audiences’ faces. Here, Perry transforms abjection—feeling like trash, unmoored, socially dead—into incandescent triumph. In the song, the addressee’s personal triumph evokes u.s. nationalist narratives of overcoming colonization (i.e., the Declaration of Independence, celebrated on the Fourth of July). Feminine incandescence—the transformation of waste and melancholy into glowing potential—is no longer revolutionary. Not only parallel to u.s. nationalism, it is the very means for reproducing normativity. In resilience discourse, wild and crazy femmes—like, say, Ke$ha— reproduce normativity in the same way that deregulatory economic practices do (see Cardenas). Unlike Kant’s genius, who gives laws and generates order (i.e., regulation, giving a law) out of unruly materiality, the incandescent, “gaga” femme amplifies what feels like disorder by “resignif[ying] damaged bodies and objects previously expelled from the realm of meaning” (6). And to do this, incandescent femme geniuses use a specific type of experimentation, what Ziarek calls “a dynamic model of interrelation between literary form and material elements of the work of art” (6). This “dynamic interaction” between large-scale form and material details produces “effects” that are “unpredictable and unforeseeable” (Adorno qtd. in Ziarek 114). Experimental methods produce aleatory results.14 Neoliberalism, however, has systematized the aleatory; deregulatory practices are designed to control background conditions so that “dynamic interactions” between form and material produce a range of superficially random outcomes.15 Deregulation turns experimentation into the means of capitalist/hegemonic production. Brilliant gaga ecstasy is what fuels economic and social reproduction.16 So even though incandescent potentiality might be “the very opposite of the traffic in women” (Ziarek 119) figured as the exchange of commodities (e.g., in Irigaray and Rubin), it is quite consistent with neoliberal political and aesthetic economies. Who radiates with potentiality more than the resilient, entrepreneurial postfeminist woman? In the same way that feminized, blackened receptivity was the solution to modernist anxieties about alienation (e.g., the aforementioned Gooding-Williams), feminized, racially nonwhite resilience is taken as a solution to the problem of the “end of art.” Having transgressed all limits and prohibitions—for example, emancipating dissonance, making music out of noise—modernist art had no means of establishing its opposition to society/social normativity. Similarly, capitalism had colonized the globe, exhausting its ability to profit through simple expansion; with no new markets, with nothing else new to conquer, it needed a new method for generating surplus value. As Jeffery Nealon and others argue, capitalism has become a logic of investment and intensity. Instead of expanding and assimilating, it recycles waste and increases efficiencies. Thus, traditionally non- or devalued “women’s work” becomes the fastest growing sector of the service-and-care-work economy. And women’s art-making practices become the hottest new thing in the artworld: think of all the “feminist art” retrospectives and exhibits that have taken place in the past five or so years. Modernism’s constitutive outside becomes neoliberalism’s bread and butter; or, the abject is now central to the means of capital, political, and aesthetic production.17

#### The aff’s demands buy into the logic of the speed-elite – the push to make debate a site of activism and circulate their narrative mystifies their reliance on unethical modes of technology and communication that results in a cooption of their advocacy, redirecting it towards ends that are fundamentally military

**Hoofd 10** (Ingrid M. Hoofd, Assistant Professor in the Communications and New Media Programme at the National University of Singapore, Feb 2010, “The accelerated university: Activist-academic alliances and simulation of thought,” ephemera, http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/accelerated-university-activist-academic-alliances-and-simulation-thought)

Although Facoltà di Fuga and Ricercatori Precari do not ally themselves explicitly with the alter-globalist movement, their call against neo-liberalism and for online thinking and research in service of the struggles of ‘the oppressed and marginalised’ makes them quite suitable for creating such alliances. This call for ‘knowledge in service of the oppressed’ is more explicitly present in Investigacció (Research), which was set up in order to combine the agendas of social movement activists with those of university researchers. In their flyer for their first international meeting on ‘Social Movements and Activist Research’ in 2004 in Spain, Investigacció likewise aptly accuses the neo-liberal privatisation of knowledge as the main cause for current social exclusion. Knowledge, in their view, instead should be produced from the ‘focal point of activist research’ which should entail the ‘actual subjectivities of research from and for social movements’, instead of from those who reside within the privileged space of academia (Investigacció, 2005: 1). The meeting is hopefully envisioned to be a ‘space of encounter and self-formation’ which ‘self-constitute[s] as a-disciplinary so that we can overcome the fictitious distinctions common to academicism’ (2005: 2). Knowledge will thus, according to Investigacció, be generated ‘from our own subjectivities (in contrast to aiming for scientific ‘objectivity’) without limitations or hierarchies’ (2005: 3). But far from an ‘a-disciplinary self-constitution’ that supposedly overcomes any fictitious distinction, Investigacció for one relies heavily on the common fictitious distinction between activism and academia to validate their praxis. By contrasting their initiative to the false objectivity of academicism, they **validate their own knowledge production** by **claiming to be in the margins** as opposed to **the ‘ivory tower’**, as if the latter is a stable area from which one can detach oneself from the outside world and hence **objectively analyse**. Also, **one could wonder to what extent one is actually speaking from the margins when one has the time, technologies, spaces and connections to organise an event** like Investigacció. The desire to generate knowledge from **‘one’s own subjectivity, without limitations’** (2005: 3**) is analogous to the mythical humanist narrative of breaking with and improving upon previous knowledge – a form of knowledge-innovation that the academic institution is also infused with.** The university of excellence as well as its doublings into projects like Investigacció are therefore an effect of its repetitions (with a difference) into the neo-liberal mythical space of progress and acceleration. The creation of more and more ‘spaces and mechanisms of production, exchange and collective reflection’ (2005: 3) is indeed precisely what late-capitalism seeks to forge, as long as such reflection generates an intensification of production. **The idea that subjectivities from social movements are in any way less produced by neo-liberal globalisation is highly problematic**. In fact, such an idea suggests a **rather positivist notion of the subject** – similar to that supposedly objective academic individual Investigacció seeks to dethrone. Investigacció then somewhat nostalgically narrates a subject untainted by power structures and technologies. In fact, the Investigaccióinitiative displays how the subject of activist research empowers her- or himself throughrecreating the fictitious distinction between activism and academia. S/he does so by reproducing this opposition, which in turn co-creates and accelerates these ‘new spaces’ – spaces that were created with the goal of facilitating global capitalism and its speed-elite, and that allow for the perfection of military power through technologies of surveillance. The call for participants to become active and productive in co-organising the international event – of course, without any monetary remuneration – is also much present in Investigacció’s rhetoric. They suggest that participants should engage with one another not only at the meeting, but especially through the online spaces Investigacció has created for the purpose of generating **activist research**. ‘**Take action!’ says their flyer**, ‘[...] **make it so the conference is yours**!’ This seductive appeal to the subject-individual as the centre of creative production is very common to neo-liberal consumerism and its emphasis on cybernetic interactivity. But it is also false in that it gives the participants a sense of control over Investigacció that they actually do not have – eventually, the main organisers (have already) set the agenda and handed out the stakes. In short, the organisers fail to situate themselves by pretending everyone is on the same level of privilege – for example, not requiring monetary compensation – in this project, and this failure is strangely an effect of their attempt at reviving a more democratic academic structure. Information Initially, one could think that Baudrillard’s assessment **confirms my analytical suspicion regarding activist-research projects**. In ‘The Implosion’, Baudrillard starts from the premise that the **increase of information** in our media-saturated society **results in a loss of meaning** because it ‘**exhausts itself** in the act of **staging communication’**. New media technologies **exacerbate the subject’s fantasy of transparent communication**, while increasingly what are communicated are mere copies of the same, a ‘recycling in the negative of the traditional institution’ (Baudrillard, 1994: 80). New technologies are simply the **materialisation of that fantasy of communication**, and the ‘**lure’** (1994: 81) of such a **technocratic system** resides in the requirement of **active political engagement to uphold that fantasy**. **This translates in a call to subjectivise oneself** – **to be vocal, participate, and to ‘play the [...] liberating claim of subjecthood’** (1994: 85). The result of the intensifying circular logic of this system, he says, is that meaning not only implodes in the media, but also that **the social implodes in the masses** – the construction of a ‘hyperreal’ (1994: 81). Contra the claim of Glocal Research Space that such praxes of alliance are ‘without an object’ (Glocal Research Space, 2003: 19), this does not mean that objectification does not take place at all. Instead, and in line with Baudrillard’s argument, the urge to subjectivise oneself and the objectification of the individual go hand in hand under speed-elitism – a double bind that locks the individual firmly into her or his technocratic conditions. Indeed, the argument in ‘Activist Research’ that ‘research [should be] like an effective procedure [which is] in itself already a result’ (2003: 19) describes the conditions of Readings’ ‘university of excellence’ where any research activity, thanks to technological instantaneity, translates immediately into the capitalist result of increased information flow (Readings, 1996: 22). **Active subjects and their others become the cybernetic objects of such a system of information flow**. The insistence in ‘Activist Research’ on free, travelling and nomadic research simply makes sure that this logic of increased flow is repeated. Because of this desire for increased flow and connection, **activist-research projects are paradoxically highly exclusivist in advocating the discourses and tools of the speed-elite**. The problem with projects like Edu-Factory or the **productive cross-over of activism and academia** is therefore not only that **their political counter-information means just more information** (**and loss of meaning**) **as well as more capitalist production**, but that **it puts its faith in precisely those technologies and fantasies of control, communication and of ‘being political’ that underlie the current logic of overproduction.** It is at this point that John Armitage and Joanne Roberts in ‘Chronotopia’ contend that such a **‘cyclical repetition’** (Armitage and Roberts, 2002: 52) is **particularly dangerous** because the fantasy of control remains exactly that, a **fantasy**. At the same time, this increasingly forceful repetition **can only eventually give way to ‘the accident’ because chronotopian speed-spaces are fundamentally and exponentially unstable**. Armitage and Roberts’ idea of ‘cyclical repetition’ through chronotopianism does thus not mean an exact repetition of the speed-elite’s quest for mastery – instead, I would argue that it is this **immanent quality of difference in repetition**, of the ‘**essential drifting due to [a technology’s] iterative structure** cut off from […] consciousness as the authority of the last analysis’ as Derrida calls it in ‘Signature Event Context’ (Derrida, 1982: 316) **that allows for the accident or true event to appear**. The difference through technologically sped-up repetition appears then perhaps as a potential, but only precisely as a growing potential that cannot be willed – in this sense, it will be an unanticipated event indeed. One could then speak of an intensification of politics in what is perhaps too hastily called the neo-liberal university, opening up unexpected spaces for critique in the face of its neo-liberalisation, which in turn points to **the fundamental instability of its enterprise**. Activist-research projects add to this intensification by virtue of their **techno-acceleration**. This intensification of politics is **no ground for univocal celebration**, since it remains also the hallmark of the neo-liberal mode of production of knowledge through the new tele-technologies as excellent, regardless of its critical content. The current university’s instability mirrors and aggravates the volatility of a capitalism marked by non-sustainability, a growing feminisation of poverty, the rise of a new global upper class, and **highly mediated illusions of cybernetic mastery**. **This nonetheless also opens up new forms of thought, if only appearing as ‘accidents’**. Derrida hints at this, but also at the university’s elusiveness, in ‘Mochlos, or: the Conflict of the Faculties’, when he claims that he ‘would almost call [the university] the child of an inseparable couple, metaphysics and technology’ (Derrida, 1993: 5, emphasis mine). Almost, but never quite – **here then emerges the possibility of truly subversive change**. But **this change will not be brought about by the mere content of the critique, but by the way it pushes acceleration to the point of systemic disintegration or implosion**. In Fatal Strategies, **Baudrillard calls this the ‘fatal strategy’ that contemporary theory must adopt: a sort of conceptual suicide attack which aims at pulling the rug out from under the speed-elitist mobilisation of semiotic oppositions, and which shows the paradox behind any attempt at structural predictions.** In ‘The Final Solution’, Baudrillard relates this intensification of the humanist obsession with dialectics, mastery, and transparency – the quest for immortality that is at the basis of techno-scientific research – to **destruction and the death drive** through the metaphor of and actual research around cloning, which strangely resonates well with Derrida’s investigation of the tele-technological archive in Archive Fever. **I read Baudrillard’s ‘Final Solution’ here as a metaphor for the duplication (cloning) of thought into virtual spaces outside the university walls proper**. If contemporary research seeks to make human cloning possible, argues Baudrillard, then **this endeavour is equivalent to cancer**: after all, cancer is simply automatic cloning, a deadly form of multiplication. It is of interest here to note that the possibility of creating an army of clones has likewise **garnered much military interest**, just **as academia today more and more serves military ends**. As the logic of cloning as automatic multiplication is typical of all current technological and humanist advancements, **the exacerbation of this logic can only mean more promise and death**. At this point my argument mirrors **the apocalyptic tone of the activist-research projects**. In the final analysis, the problem with Edu-Factory, Facoltà di Fuga, Investigacció, Universidad Nómada, Ricercatori Precari, and Glocal Research Space is that these projects entail a very specific form of subjugation with dire consequences for the slower and less techno-genic classes. Techno-scientific progress entails a regress into immortality, epitomised by a nostalgia typical of the current socio-technical situation, for when we were ‘undivided’ (Baudrillard, 2000: 6). I contend that Baudrillard refers not only to the lifeless stage before humans became sexed life forms, but also makes an allusion to psycho-analytic readings of the ‘subject divided in language’ and its nostalgia for wholeness and transparent communication. **The desire for immortality, like archive fever, is therefore the same as the Freudian death drive, and we ourselves ultimately become the object of our technologies of scrutiny and nostalgia**. **The humanist quest of totally transparency of oneself and of the world to oneself that grounds the idea of the modern techno-scientific university, is ultimately an attempt at (self-)destruction, or in any case an attempted destruction of (one’s) radical difference [alterity]. The urgent political question**, which Stiegler problematically avoided in Disorientation, then becomes: which selves are and will become caught up in the delusion of total self-transparency and self-justification, and which selves will be destroyed? And how may we conceive of **an ‘ethic of intellectual inquiry or aesthetic contemplation’** that **‘resists the imperatives of speed’**, as Jon Cook likewise wonders in ‘The Techno-University and the Future of Knowledge’ (Cook, 1999: 323)? It is of particular importance to note here that **the very inception of this question and its possible analysis, like the conception of the speed-elite, is itself again a performative repetition of the grounding myth of the university of independent truth, justice and reason**. Therefore, in carrying forward the humanist promise, this analysis is itself bound up in the intensification of the logic of acceleration and destruction, and that is then also equally tenuous. This complicity of thought in the violence of acceleration itself in turn quickens the machine of the humanist promise, and can only manifest itself in the prediction of a coming apocalypse – whether it concerns a narrative of the death of thought and the university, or of a technological acceleration engendering the Freudian death drive. **We are then simply the next target in the technological realisation of complete** γνωθι σαυτον (**know thyself) – or so it seems. Because after all, a clone is never an exact copy, as Baudrillard very well knows; and therefore, the extent to which activist-research projects hopefully invite alterity can thankfully not yet be thought.**

**Speed-elitism has outpaced Eurocentrism as the primary nexus of power – their reliance on affective tropes of redemption and resilience bolster’s the state’s extractive colonial capacity**

Hoofd 10 (Ingrid M. Hoofd, Assistant Professor in the Communications and New Media Programme at the National University of Singapore (NUS). The accelerated university: Activist academic alliances and the simulation of thought, ephemera, Feb 2010, 2010 ephemera 10(1): 7-24)

Neoliberal capitalism is hence a system in which the most intimate and fundamental aspects of human social life – in particular, forms of thought and linguistic difference – are formally subsumed under this system by being **circulated** as capital. In “Resisting the Neoliberal Discourse of Technology’, Armitage elaborates on this theme of circulation by pointing out that the current mode of late-capitalism relies on the continuous extension and validation of the infrastructure and the optimistic discourses of the new information technologies. Discourses that typically get repeated in favour of what I designate as the emerging speed-elite are those of connection, instantaneity, liberation, transformation, multiplicity and border crossing. **Speed-elitism**, I therefore argue, **replaces Eurocentrism** today as the primary nexus around which global and local disparities are organised, even though it largely builds on the formalisation of Eurocentric conceptual differences like doing versus thinking, and East versus West. Under speed-elitism, the utopian emphasis on the transparent mediation through technologies of instantaneity gives rise to the *fantasy* of the networked spaces ‘outside’ the traditional academic borders as radical spaces, as well as **the desire for** a productive dialogue or alliance between activism and academia. This would mean that activism and academia have become *relative* others under globalisation, in which the (non-Western or anti-capitalist) activist figures as some kind of *hallucination* of radical otherness for the Western intellectual. This technological hallucination serves an increasingly aggressive neo-colonial and patriarchal economic state of exploitation, despite – or perhaps rather *because of* – such technologies of travel and communication having come to figure as tools for liberation and transformation. So the discourses of techno-progress, making connections, heightened mobility and crossing borders in activist-academic alliances often go hand in hand with the (implicit) celebration of highly mediated spaces for action and communication between allied groups. Such **discourses** however **suppress** the **violent colonial, capitalist and patriarchal** history of those technological spaces and the subsequent unevenness of any such alliance. More severely, they **foster an oppressive** sort of **imaginary ‘collective’ or ‘unity of struggles’ through the myth of ‘truly’ allowing for radical difference and multiplicity within that space** – a form of **techno-inclusiveness that** in turn **excludes** a variety of **non-technogenic groups and slower classes**. That these highly mediated spaces of thought and knowledge production are exclusivist is also shown by Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades’ study of the transformation of higher education in ‘The Academic Capitalist Knowledge/Learning Regime’. Slaughter and Rhoades argue that new technologies allow the neo-liberal university to precisely cross the borders of universities and external for-profit and non-profit agencies in the name of development, production and efficacy, resulting in ‘new circuits of knowledge’. These ‘opportunity structures’ (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004: 306) that the neoliberal economy creates, I in turn argue, become precisely those spaces of imagination that come to signify as well as being resultant of the university’s humanist promise of reaching-out to alterity. This paradoxically also **leads to** what Slaughter and Rhoades accurately identify as a ‘**restratification among and within** **colleges** and **universities’** (2004: 307). *Thought* is then increasingly exercised in, and made possible through, spaces that are just as much spaces of acceleration and militarisation. The increasing complicity of the humanities in the applied sciences within the contemporary university, and hence the integration of critical thinking and neo-liberalist acceleration, is also a major theme running through Jacques Derrida’s *Eyes of the University*. Derrida there suggests that neo-liberalisation entails a militarisation of the university, claiming that ‘never before has so-called basic research been so deeply committed to ends that are at the same time military ends’ (Derrida, 2004: 143). The intricate relation between the military (‘missiles’) and the imperatives of the humanities (‘missives’) also pervades Derrida’s ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now’, in which he argues that the increasing urgency with which intellectuals feel compelled to address disenfranchisement and crisis **paradoxically** leads to a differential acceleration of such oppression through technologies of instantaneous action. But the relationship between new technologies and the subject’s *perception* of and subsequent desire for the incorporation of otherness that speed-elitism engenders, is best illustrated through Derrida’s *Archive Fever* and *Monolingualism of the Other*. Derrida’s concerns here are not so much directly with the contemporary university, but rather with the link between how thought is situated in technologies of communication (like language) and the emergence of authority as well as (academic and activist) empowerment.

**You should vote negative in favor of the 1nc’s poetic, speculative research method that takes problem in visibility through rendering it visible – this is an ethics of intellectual inquiry that resists the imperative of speeding up the flow of information and instead performs the trick of fatal theory, engendering an accident in the infrastructure that brings about the possibility of the event. Our refusal of the affirmative’s will to knowledge beyond the point of speculation clones the the form of debate, causing the university to implode from within.**

**Hoofd 17** (Ingrid M. Hoofd, Assistant Professor in the Communications and New Media Programme at the National University of Singapore, 2017, “Higher Education and Technological Acceleration: The Disintegration of University Teaching and Research,” Palgrave Macmillan US, <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51409-7>, pg: 146-151)

The fundamental **instability of the university via its ‘self-deconstruction’** therefore also opens up new forms of thought and imaginative opportunities, if only for now appearing as disastrous yet perhaps fortuitous ‘accidents.’ Derrida in fact hints at this, but also at the university’s elusiveness, in “Mochlos, or: the Confl ict of the Faculties,” when he claims that he “would almost call [the university] the child of an inseparable couple, metaphysics and technology” (1993, 5; emphasis mine). Almost, but never quite—here then emerges the possibility of **truly subversive change**—in the **paradoxical gap** prised open between the machinery of transparency and its exceedingly stealthy theoretical, administrative, and methodological operations. This change however will then **not be brought about by the mere content of the critique, but by the way it disastrously pushes acceleration to the point of systemic disintegration or implosion**. In Fatal Strategies, Baudrillard calls this the **“fatal strategy”** that contemporary theory must adopt: a sort of **conceptual suicide attack which aims at pulling the rug out under the speed-elitist mobilisation of** a host of **problematic semiotic oppositions**, which also will illustrate the fundamental paradox behind any attempt at structural predictions. In another one of his ‘fatal’ book-chapters titled “The Final Solution,” Baudrillard relates this intensification of the humanist **obsession with dialectics, mastery, and transparency**—the quest for immortality that is at the basis of techno-scientific research—to destruction and the death drive through the metaphor of and actual research around cloning, which strangely resonates well with Derrida’s investigation of the tele-technological archive in Archive Fever. I read Baudrillard’s “Final Solution” at this stage also as a metaphor for the duplication **(cloning) of thought into virtual spaces** outside the university walls proper, without such a cloning ever succeeding to force its **compulsory optimism** on everyone and everything. If contemporary research seeks to make possible human cloning, argues Baudrillard, then this endeavour is equivalent to cancer: after all, cancer is simply **automatic cloning, a deadly form of multiplication**. It is of interest here to note that the possibility of creating an army of clones has likewise garnered much military interest, just as academia today more and more serves military ends. As the logic of cloning as automatic multiplication is typical of all current technological and humanist advancements, the **exacerbation of this logic can only mean more promise and death, or** perhaps **even promise through death**. Techno-scientifi c progress entails a regress into immortality, epitomised by a nostalgia typical of the current socio- technical situation, for when we were “undivided” (2000, 6). At this point such an argument in fact problematically mirrors the apocalyptic tone of, for instance, the activist-research projects as well as of Heidegger’s arguments. But I contend that Baudrillard refers not only to the lifeless stage before humans became sexed life forms, but also makes an allusion to psychoanalytic readings of the ‘subject divided in language’ and its **nostalgia for wholeness and transparent communication**. The **desire for immortality**, like archive fever, is therefore the same as the Freudian **death drive**, and we ourselves ultimately become the **object of our technologies of scrutiny and nostalgia**. The **humanist quest for total transparency of oneself** and of the world to oneself that grounds the idea of the modern techno-scientific university is therefore ultimately an attempt at (self-)destruction, or in any case an attempted **destruction of (one’s) radical difference** that needs to run its course. The urgent political question which Bernard Stiegler, for instance, as I showed in a previous chapter, problematically avoided in Disorientation , then becomes: which selves are and will become caught up in the **delusion of total self-transparency** and self-justification, and which selves will be destroyed? And how may we conceive of an “ethic of intellectual inquiry or aesthetic contemplation” that “**resist**s **the imperatives of speed**,” as Jon Cook likewise wonders in “The Techno-University and the Future of Knowledge” (1999, 323)? It is of particular importance to note here that the very inception of this question and its possible analysis, like the conception of the speed-elite mounted by this book, is itself again a **performative repetition** of the grounding myth of the university of independent truth, justice, and reason. Therefore, in carrying forward the humanist promise, this analysis is itself bound up in the **intensification of the logic of acceleration** and destruction, but is then also equally tenuous. This **complicity of thought in the violence of acceleration** itself in turn **quickens the machine of the humanist promise**, and can only manifest itself in the prediction of a **coming apocalypse**—whether it concerns a narrative of the death of thought and the university, or of a technological acceleration engendering the Freudian death drive. We academics are then simply the next target in the **technological realisation of complete** γνωθι σαυτον (‘**know thyself’**)—or so it seems . Because after all, **a clone is never an exact copy**, as Baudrillard very well knows; and therefore, the extent to which all the teaching and research projects discussed in this book hopefully invite alterity can thankfully **not yet be thought**. The work of Virilio is therefore helpful because it abandons the ‘compulsory optimism’ of standard academic rhetoric for a more **fragile optimism that seeks to affirm the fundamental unknowability** or sacredness that makes knowledge possible in the fi rst place. In this sense, Virilio and Baudrillard urge us, as Derrida described it, to ‘take a more originary responsibility’ in light of the current negative fallout of the aporetic ideals of the academic institution. And as I hinted at in Chap. 1, every form of idealism indeed eventually will be or needs to be subjected to its own critique, and perhaps eventually even needs to succumb to it. As much as the practices of these theories, centres, organisations, and left-wing academics are the outflow of a **logic of increased visibility and transparency**, they also render into visible form the **perverse logic of ‘incorporating’ and ‘connecting’** **everything** and everyone, which, for instance, some of the theorists that argue for ‘bottom-up learning’ outlined as a virtue, in an exceedingly staged **visual profusion of relative otherness**. Since academic productivity and activism find themselves wholly aligned with the perverse ideals of the university, raising its stakes would therefore not lie in the familiar recanting of ‘freedom,’ ‘empowerment,’ or ‘democracy,’ but in the **reinsertion of the (inter-)subjective and ‘noisy’ element** in all its teaching and research practices. This would entail an emphasis on the necessary respect for that ‘**unknown quantity’** that is **inherent in all meaningful learning** and interaction, a newfound acknowledgement of the magical aspects of the universe as foundational for all appreciation of it. As Virilio stresses in his second chapter of The Vision Machine, “**the presupposition of not-knowing** and especially not-seeing … **restores to every research project its fundamental context of prime ignorance**” so that we “need to admit that for the human eye the essential is invisible” (1994, 23). Baudrillard echoes Virilio’s insight in “The Theorem of the Accursed Share” by emphasising that indeed “Anything that purges the accursed share signs its own death warrant” (1990, 121). Perhaps the biggest mistake in the modern founding of the university then was the **denial and attempted erasure of the** religious or **spiritual aspect of the university**, so that, instead of being a vision machine, a ‘more originary responsibility’ would consist of letting it become a ‘humility machine’ in the spirit of its pre-Enlightenment ethics? In any case, the acknowledgement of the profound tension at the basis of the university and the ways it has intensified itself to such an extent today that more and more academics are starting to become disillusioned or confused about their calling, perhaps provides us usefully with the **return of that “fatalism” and “magic worldview**” that especially Freire so eagerly sought to eradicate. We may therefore want to welcome the **upsetting force of such a fatal attitude towards the ideal of ‘communication as community’** as the true antidote, or perhaps even the quintessential shadow, which has always secretly accompanied the university’s quest for total communication and transparency. The possibility of radicality via communication and its functionalist theories may then fi nally and surprisingly lie in its unexpected outcomes, both positive and negative. I will be ‘keeping the faith’ together with all these projects and academics then, since also owing to all these theories and projects, **the future may be more radically open** than ever before, as long as we seriously entertain the possibility that in **moving beyond the attempted erasure of fatality and unknowability by the compulsorily optimistic academic performance** lies the potential of that ‘more **originary’ responsibility**. One of the consequences of bringing back **fatality** and fatalism means to acknowledge that the **representational ideal of scientific and philosophical theory**—the fantasy that it not only must ‘describe’ reality as closely as possible, but also that such a description is possible or desirable at all— must be **abandoned in favour of a speculative poetics**. Likewise critical theory, which tradition this book has productively mobilised, after all falls, according to Baudrillard, in The Perfect Crime victim to the thwarted ideals of **omniscience and transparent communication**. As I noted in Chap. 3, it is for this reason that Genosko in “The Drama of Theory” rightly parallels the problem of theory with the problem of political theatre, suggesting that what Baudrillard proposes is not replicating the impotent attempts of a theatre seeking to convince by way of documentary realism, but of a ‘**reversed’ theatre in which** “**the object will have its revenge on Western metaphysics**” (1994, 295). Genosko in turn helpfully refers to Baudrillard’s usage of the metaphor of the ‘crystal,’ which I concur can be read as an idealisation of the perfectly transparent object and the ideal crystalline universe seemingly represented in scientifi c description, but just as much as a ‘crystal ball’ into which one “gazes in order to arouse a myriad of sensations”—not the least that sensation of uncertainty as well as an ambivalence concerning the fact that one is being **seduced by that object** (1994, 296). William Bogard usefully points out in “Baudrillard, Time, and the End,” that seduction indeed precisely consists of “the overcoming of defences (of ‘immunity’)” (1994, 333). Baudrillard also follows this logic of a ‘revenge of the crystal’ when he stresses in an interview with Nicholas Zurbrugg in Baudrillard Live on the possibilities of a renewed theoretical radicalism, that Perhaps **the only thing one can do is to destabilize** and provoke **the world around us**. We shouldn’t presume to produce positive solutions … one needs to make a kind of **detour through the strategy of the worst scenario**. **It’s not a question of ideas—there are already too many ideas!** (1993, 170–171; italics in original) To conclude then, to **let the auto-immune disease run its course** therefore would entail fi rstly seeing the university, from its very inception, for the **ridiculous scam** that it is: a marvellously absurd outgrowth of the **delusional ideals of Enlightenment humanism**. However, this also means that any representational theoretical critique like this one is just as much a scam of the authority of theoretical analysis, in which possibly, as Lyotard suggested, truth and technique have collapsed into one another. So this book, by partaking in the same ideals of visibility while exposing the problem of the contemporary university to scrutiny and visibility, suggests that we follow a strategy of **‘fatal’ consciousness-raising** in order **to** hopefully **plant the seeds of future radical events** regarding academia. An example here might be a staff and student exodus from the university’s current imperative, which would signify a notable **collapse** of **its prime beliefs towards a more mystical thinking** in the hard sciences and in the humanities. Perhaps **we should simply let the university bleed to death** for now. **Only** such **a**n apparent **‘solution’ that seeks not solve anything at all or make any predictions**, while seemingly absurd, may mean the hoped for **death of the** contemporary **university and its revival as a radically different entity**. This book must therefore fi nally **remain speculative and opaque**, and mount this fi nal chapter as a polemical provocation that does not seek to pre-programme what the next stage of the university should look like or which ideals need to be chanted, as doing so would itself fall prey to the problematic and ultimately **managerialist claim of transparent (fore)knowledge and** true **emancipation**. This book, in all its philosophical and analytical exposition, after all cannot even with certainty claim that it has represented the reality of the contemporary university in any kind of self-assured manner, or that it does not sneakily mix up the ‘observed pattern’ and the ‘pattern of observation.’ So is this book itself not simply just as much partaking in the delusion that the university always has been? To paraphrase Derrida once again: the university, truly, what an idea! Time perhaps to lay that cursed institution to rest for now and put down that alluring crystal ball, so that we all may rest too.

## Case

#### Vote NEG on presumption –

#### Discussions about liberation and the past have been circulating outside of debate, and no change has happened. No reason the symbolic affirmation of voting AFF is key.

#### the aff doesn’t articulate how their method happens – you should make them articulate it – voting aff doesnt change how black people are marked by society – expecting a judge’s ballot to change anything in debate is cruel optimism – they are just another deployment of black energy that gets coopted by the idea of debate as a space for change

#### They’re the next big thing!

Frank 97– prof of American History at Univ of Chicago [Thomas The Business of Culture in the new Gilded Age Commodify Your Dissent: Salvos from The Baffler ed. By Frank and Weiland; “Why Johnny Can’t Dissent”; Pages 31-32)

CAPITALISM IS CHANGING, obviously and drastically. From the moneyed pages of the Wall Street journal to TV commercials for airlines and photocopiers we hear every day about the new order’s globe spanning, cyber-accumulating ways. But our notion about what’s wrong with American life and how the figures responsible are to be confronted haven't changed much in thirty years. Call it, for convenience, the “countercultural idea.” It holds that the paramount ailment of our society is conformity, a malady that has variously been described as over-organization, bureaucracy, homogeneity, hierarchy, logocentrism, technocracy, the Combine, the Apollonian. We all know what it is and what it does. It transforms humanity into “organization man,” into “the man in the gray flannel suit.” It is “Moloch whose mind is pure machinery, ”the “incomprehensible prison” that consumes “brains and imagination.” It is artifice, starched shirts, tailfins, carefully mowed lawns, and always, always, the consciousness of impending nuclear destruction. It is a stiff, militaristic order that seeks to suppress instinct, to forbid sex and pleasure, to deny basic human impulses and individuality, to enforce through a rigid uniformity a meaningless plastic consumerism. As this half of the countercultural idea originated during the 1990s, it is appropriate that the evils of conformity are most conveniently summarized with images of 1950s suburban correctness. You know, that land of sedate music, sexual repression, deference to authority, Red Scares, and smiling white people standing politely in line to go to church. Constantly appearing as a symbol of arch backwardness in advertising and movies, it is an image we find easy to evoke. The ways in which this system are to be resisted are equally Well understood and agreed-upon. The Establishment demands homogeneity; we revolt by embracing diverse, individual lifestyles. It demands self-denial and rigid adherence to convention; we revolt through immediate gratification, instinct uninhibited, and liberation of the libido and the appetites. Few have put it more bluntly than jerry Rubin did in 1970: “America says: Don’t! The hippies say: Do lt!" The countercultural idea is hostile to any law and every establishment. “Whenever we see a rule, we must break it,” Rubin continued. “Only by breaking rules do we discover who we are. ”Above all rebellion consists of a sort of Nietzschean antinomianism, an automatic questioning of rules, a rejection of whatever social prescriptions we 've happened to inherit. Just Do It is the whole of the law. But one hardly has to go to a poetry reading to see the countercultural idea acted out. Its frenzied ecstasies have long since become an official aesthetic of consumer society, a monotheme of mass as well as adversarial culture. Turn on the TV and there it is instantly: the unending drama of consumer unbound and in search of an ever-heightened good time, the inescapable rock 'n' roll soundtrack, dreadlocks and ponytails bounding into Taco Bells, a drunken, swinging-camera epiphany of tennis shoes, outlaw soda pops, and mind-bending dandruff shampoos. Corporate America, it turns out, no longer speaks in the voice of oppressive order that it did when Ginsberg moaned in 1956 that Time magazine was “always telling me about responsibility. Businessmen are serious. Movie producers are serious. Everybody 's serious but me.” Nobody wants you to think they’re serious today, least of all Time Warner. On the contrary: the Culture Trust is now our leader in the Ginsbergian search for kicks upon kicks. Corporate America is not an oppressor but a sponsor of fun, provider of lifestyle accouterments, facilitator of carnival, our slang-speaking partner in the quest for that ever-more apocalyptic orgasm. The countercultural idea has become capitalist orthodoxy, its hunger for transgression upon transgression now perfectly suited to an economic-cultural regime that runs on ever-faster cyclings of the new; its taste for self-fulfillment and its intolerance f1or the confines of tradition now permitting vast latitude in consuming practices and lifestyle experimentation. Consumerism is no longer about “conformity” but about “difference.” Advertising teaches us not in the ways of puritanical self-denial (a bizarre notion on the face of it), but in orgiastic, never-ending self'-fulfillment. It counsels not rigid adherence to the tastes of the herd but vigilant and constantly updated individualism. We consume not to fit in, but to prove, on the surface at least, that we are rock 'n' roll rebels, each one of us as rule-breaking and hierarchy-defying as our heroes of the 60s, who now pitch cars, shoes, and beer. This imperative of endless difference is today the genius at the heart of American capitalism, an eternal fleeing from “sameness” that satiates our thirst for the New with such achievements of civilization as the infinite brands of identical cola, the myriad colors and irrepressible variety of the cigarette rack at 7-Eleven. As existential rebellion has become a more or less official style of Information Age capitalism, so has the countercultural notion of a static, repressive Establishment grown hopelessly obsolete. However the basic impulses of the countercultural idea may have disturbed a nation lost in Cold War darkness, they are today in fundamental agreement with the basic tenets of Information Age business theory. So close are they, in fact, that it has become difficult to understand the countercultural idea as anything more than the self justifying ideology of the new bourgeoisie that has arisen since the 1960s, the cultural means by which this group has proven itself ever so much better skilled than its slow-moving, security-minded forebears at adapting to the accelerated, always-changing consumerism of today. The anointed cultural opponents of capitalism are now capitalism’s ideologues. The two come together in perfect synchronization in a figure like Camille Paglia, whose ravings are grounded in the absolutely noncontroversial ideas of the golden sixties. According to Paglia, American business is still exactly what it was believed to have been in that beloved decade, that is, “puritanical and desensualized.” Its great opponents are, of course, liberated figures like “the beatniks,” Bob Dylan, and the Beatles. Culture is, quite simply, a binary battle between the repressive Apollonian order of capitalism and the Dionysian impulses of the counterculture. Rebellion makes no sense without repression; we must remain forever convinced of capitalism's fundamental hostility to pleasure in order to consume capitalism’s rebel products as avidly as we do. It comes as little surprise when, after criticizing the “Apollonian capitalist machine” (in her book, Kamp.: 6' Tramps), Paglia applauds American mass culture (in Utne Reader), the preeminent product of that “capitalist machine,” as a “third great eruption” of a Dionysian “paganism.” For her, as for most other designated dissidents, there is no contradiction between replaying the standard critique of capitalist conformity and repressiveness and then endorsing its rebel products—for Paglia the car culture and Madonna—as the obvious solution: the Culture Trust offers both Establishment and Resistance in one convenient package. The only question that remains is why Paglia has not yet landed an endorsement contract from a soda pop or automobile manufacturer.

#### Even if the aff’s *demands* are radical, their presentation is not --- their method is a constraining affective investment that legitimizes violence

Lundberg 12 (Christian Lundberg, Co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies and Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina, PhD in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, p. 174-177)

Thus, "as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!" At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students' call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization. The case of the hysteric produces an additional problem in defining jouissance as equivalent with hegemony. One way of defining hysteria is to say that it is a form of enjoyment that is defined by its very disorganization. As Gerard Wajcman frames it, the fundamental analytical problem in defining hysteria is precisely that it is a paradoxical refusal of organized enjoyment by a constant act of deferral. This deferral functions by asserting a form of agency over the Other while simultaneously demanding that the Other provide an organizing principle for hysterical enjoyment, something the Other cannot provide. Hysteria never moves beyond the question or the riddle, as Wajcman argues: the "hysteric ... cannot be mastered by knowledge and therefore remains outside of history, even outside its own .... [I]f hysteria is a set of statements about the hysteric, then the hysteric is what eludes those statements, escapes this knowledge .... [T]he history of hysteria bears witness to something fundamental in the human condition-being put under pressure to answer a question.T'" Thus, a difficulty for a relatively formal/ structural account of hegemony as a substitute for jouissance without reduction: where is the place for a practice of enjoyment that by its nature eludes nanling in the order of knowledge? This account of hysteria provides a significant test case for the equation betweenjouissance and hegemony, for the political promise and peril of demands and ultimately for the efficacy of a hysterical politics. But the results of such a test can only be born out in the realm of everyday politics. On Resistance: The Dangers of Enjoying One's Demands The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a political practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. "Danger" functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors' imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level the demand's rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus's interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state's love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject's marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation. First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state's actions. Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics to retreat from the "politics of policy and public debate.":" Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of "theory" and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state's refusal often makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to political purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal "no." Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hysterical politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition. These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the content of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds, Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: "demand in itself ... is demand of a presence or of an absence ... pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of satisfying needs, that it is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied."46

#### The 1ac reprocesses suffering for the ballot as debate’s currency – in the 1AC CX they have proved that their divine feminity is tied to the ballot – this commodifies material violence as a tool of passivity – turns the case

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

#### Over-identifying black bodies as suffering/dying maintains biocentric racialization.

Katherine McKittrick 16 (Queen’s University, Canada, “Diachronic loops/deadweight tonnage/bad made measure,” cultural geographies 2016, Vol. 23(1) 3– 18)

Part 4: learning from The Zong This is, in part, then, about teaching and learning from the analytics of violence and race – for the story of The Zong asks that we be cautious about the singular narratives while also noticing the ways in which the logic of race is anchored to a monumental biocentric narrative that is invested in replicating scientific racism even in critique. The intellectual work of honoring complex racial narratives that name struggles against death can be, paradoxically, undermined by the analytical framing of racial violence. The conceptual difficulty lies in the ways in which descriptions of racial violence actually contribute to the ongoing fragmentation of human relationships rather than identifying what is really at stake when horror takes place: our collective replication of, and thus implication in, descriptive statements that profit from racial violence. While biocentric narratives have certainly been contested – social construction, socio-cultural practices, non-linear time–space experiences, and performativity are just some ways our biocentric world has been challenged – the language and process of explicating racial violence tend to fall back on an axiomatic frame of survival wherein the suffering body and the dying have always been the marginalized human Other who stands in opposition to the white Western liberated human norm, precisely because black death precedes and is necessary to this conceptual frame. This means that the analytical stakes of studying race and racism often only provide us with a story that corresponds with our existing system of knowledge, one that has already posited blackness and a black sense of place as dead and dying. Here, we would do well to notice how the inhabitants of spaces of absolute otherness can be, quite easily, discursively colonized by our intellectual investigations.42 There is a tendency to focus on a certain mode of appropriation and codification within mainstream academic questions that profit from simultaneously devaluing and damning racial–sexual intellectual narratives as they empirically collect wretched bodies. Within this framework we can apparently fix and repair the racial other by producing knowledge about the racial other that renders them less than human (and so often biologic skin, only and all body). No one moves. This is what is at stake in all of our intellectual pursuits and analyses of difference. It is therefore worth thinking about the ways in which the cyclical and death-dealing analytical descriptions of the condemned remain conceptually intact, at least in part, because thinking otherwise demands attending to whole new system of knowledge – and therefore honoring radical relational reading practices and knowledges – wherein the brutalities of racial violence are not descriptively rehearsed, but always already demanding practical activities of resistance, encounter, radical disobedient black studies, and anti-colonial thinking.